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A. 
II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
Prior Post-Conviction Counsel's Affirmative Misrepresentations and Mr. Johnson's 
Personal Efforts to Remedy Counsel's Deficiencies Provide Sufficient Reason Under 
I.C. § 19-4908 to Justify a Successive Post-Conviction Relief Petition 
In the proceedings on Mr. Johnson's 2009 successive post-conviction relief action, his 
attorney affirmatively represented that he would take certain actions to support Mr. Johnson's 
claims, including filing an amended petition. Once Mr. Johnson realized that his attorney was not 
going to support his claims, he attempted to remedy the situation by filing a number of pro se 
motions, including motions to remove his attorney and to provide additional time. The district 
court dismissed the action without ruling on Mr. Johnson's prose filings. 
Mr. Johnson's own efforts to remedy the effects of counsel's performance before dismissal 
of the case distinguishes this case from Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389,391,327 PJd 365,367 
(2014) because the focus is on Mr. Johnson's efforts, not his attorney's performance. Mr. 
Johnson clearly did not waive his right to adequately support his post-conviction relief claims and 
he has established sufficient reason to present them in a successive petition. 
In response, the state notes that Mr. Johnson argued in his Opening Brief that his counsel's 
performance went beyond simple ineffective assistance of counsel and that the Idaho Court of 
Appeals recently rejected a "nearly identical argument" in Lopez v. State, Docket No. 40751, 2014 
WL 5347372, at *3 (Idaho Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2014), review denied (Jan. 9, 2015). 1 Respondent's 
Brief, p. 10. However, Mr. Johnson's attempts to remedy the impact of his attorney's 
performance distinguishes this case from that in Lopez. Specifically, the Court of Appeals 
disagreed with: 
1 This similarity is not a coincidence as the undersigned represented Mr. Lopez. 
Lopez's conclusion that the absence of any meaningful representation must 
constitute a sufficient reason under LC. § 19-4908. The Idaho Supreme Court in 
Murphy squarely and unequivocally addressed this issue, leaving no room for this 
Court to craft an exception: "ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is 
not a sufficient reason under LC.§ 19-4908 for allowing a successive petition." 
Murphy, 156 Idaho at 391,327 P.3d at 367. This is true even if, as Lopez alleges, 
the representation was so deficient as to deprive the petitioner of any meaningful 
representation because there is no statutory or constitutional right to counsel in 
post-conviction proceedings. See id at 394-95, 327 P.3d at 370-71 ("Where there 
is no right to counsel, there can be no deprivation of effective assistance of 
counsel."). 
Lopez, Docket No. 40751, 2014 WL 5347372, at *3; see also Parvin v. State, 157 Idaho 518,337 
P.3d 677, 681 (Ct. App. 2014) (Murphy makes clear that a deficiency of post-conviction counsel 
is not a "sufficient reason" to allow a successive post-conviction action to proceed.). 
Here, in Mr. Johnson's second successive petition, he alleged: 
District Court error in not having a hearing on filed motions by the Petitioner that 
were at the heart of the issues before the Court [pertaining] to the Summary 
Dismissal that the Court was deciding on. Petitioner was trying to correct errors by 
his counsel before the Court made a ruling. 
CR 7. The Register of Actions for the 2009 action, of which the district court took judicial notice, 
reflects that on December 23, 2009, Mr. Johnson filed the following: Motion to Withdraw 
Counsel, Motion to Appoint Substitution Counsel, Motion to Continue, Motion to Proceed 
without filing briefs, Motion for Order for Telephonic Hearing, Motion to Conduct Discovery, 
Affidavit in Support of Motions. Equity demands that such personal attempts to correct counsel's 
actions before the action is dismissed and which are ignored by the district court be deemed 
sufficient to present the claims in a successive action. 
While the district court judicially noticed the register of actions, Mr. Johnson's prose 
motions were not before the district court. Instead, Mr. Johnson's attorney relied on established 
2 
precedent and developed Mr. Johnson's claim that his post-conviction attorney was deficient for 
not providing information that established that his successive petition was filed within a 
reasonable time. Indeed, the district court found that the failure to present such information 
would constitute sufficient reason but that the information failed to establish that Mr. Johnson 
filed his successive petition within a reasonable time. CR 289. Accordingly, this Court should 
remand the case so that Mr. Johnson has an opportunity to support the filing of a successive 
petition under the current state of the law. 
In response, the state notes that the Court of Appeals applied Murphy to Parvin and Lopez 
following the opportunity to provide supplemental briefing. With respect to Mr. Lopez, remand 
to further support his claims was not sought because the extreme neglect suffered from several 
attorneys was adequately reflected in the record and there did not appear to be any basis to excuse 
the deficiencies in the initial action that were umelated to counsel's performance. 
Conversely, in the instant proceedings, Mr. Johnson claimed the district court should have 
heard his prose motions2 and provided him an opportunity to remedy counsel's shortcomings 
before the action was dismissed. Pro se pleadings filed by a criminal defendant who is 
represented by counsel are generally treated as a nullity unless they include an unequivocal 
request to discharge counsel, assert that counsel coerced the defendant into taking certain action, 
or reflect an adversarial relationship between the defendant and his counsel. Whiting v. State, 929 
So.2d 673, 674-75 (Fla. App. 2006). The Murphy Court outlined the prior proceedings, which 
included an evidentiary hearing, in noting that allowing petitioners to file successive petitions 
2 Mr. Lopez also argued that the district court should not have refused to consider his pro 
se complaints with respect to his attorney but the Court did not reach the argument because the 
issue only pertained to counsel in the successive action. 
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based on ineffective assistance of counsel of post-conviction counsel had created a sham of the 
system. That concern arises in situations such as Murphy where a petitioner's complaints 
concerning his attorney's performance comes with the benefit of hindsight. In cases such as this 
one, however, Mr. Johnson's complaints occurred before the case was dismissed and as soon as he 
realized his attorney did not plan to take the actions that had been previously promised. 
Affirmative misrepresentations by counsel and Mr. Johnson's own efforts to remedy the 
situation give rise to sufficient reason in the post-Murphy world. Moreover, because Murphy had 
not been issued at the time this case was in the district court, Mr. Johnson relied on showing his 
prior counsel was ineffective. Thus, if this Court finds that the evidence presented is insufficient 
to establish an issue of fact as to whether Mr. Johnson has established sufficient reason, the case 
should be remanded to allow him to develop the claim in light of Murphy. 
B. This Case Must be Remanded Because the District Court Erred in Concluding That 
Mr. Johnson Had Not Produced Sufficient Evidence to Establish an Issue of Fact as 
to Whether His Successive Petition Was Filed Within a Reasonable Time and 
Counsel Was Not Permitted to Address Mr. Johnson's Other Claims 
Here, Mr. Johnson was not initially aware that a successive post-conviction application 
was the appropriate remedy to bring the new information before the Court but immediately took 
steps to discover what he should do by contacting the paralegal and his aunt. Finally, about two 
months later, an attorney informed Mr. Johnson that he could file a successive application for 
post-conviction relief. Mr. Johnson thereafter submitted the appropriate request to obtain the 
paperwork packet from the paralegal, filled out that paperwork and then submitted the appropriate 
paperwork to make an appointment to makes copies of the packet, get the documents notarized 
and mail them out. This process took weeks of waiting. Mr. Johnson filed the instant successive 
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petition approximately four months after receiving his co-defendant's confessions. 
Here, the district court incorrectly applied the standard applicable in death penalty cases3 
as set forth in Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 727, 202 P.3d 642, 649 (2008) to determine that 
Mr. Johnson was required to initiate the successive action within 42 days within discovery of his 
co-defendant's confession or demonstrate "extraordinary" reasons for filing after forty-two days. 
CR 178-79, 296. See Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720,727,202 P.3d 642,649 (2008) (a 
reasonable time for filing a successive petition for post-conviction relief is forty-two days after the 
petitioner knew or reasonably should have known of the claim, unless the petitioner shows that 
there were extraordinary circumstances that prevented him or her from filing the claim within that 
time period). 
However, the effect of the expedited procedures mandated in death penalty case is 
ameliorated by the automatic appointment of counsel to assist the petitioner with his post-
conviction remedies. See ICR 44.2 the district judge who sentenced the defendant [to death] shall 
appoint at least one attorney to represent the defendant for the purpose of seeking any 
post-conviction remedy referred to in I.C. Section 19-2719( 4) that the defendant may choose to 
seek") (emphasis added). Unlike the death penalty applicant, petitioners seeking relief under Title 
49 must prepare and file the initial and any successive petitions without the assistance of legal 
counsel. 
3 The district court reached this conclusion in apparent response to Mr. Johnson's 
argument that his appellate attorney should have argued (as he did in seeking the Supreme 
Court's review) that applying Pizzuto 's reasoning to a non capital case means that the one year 
limitation set forth in I.C. § 19-4902 is a presumptively reasonable time frame to file a successive 
petition. Such an interpretation would be reasonable and would eliminate the surprise and 
confusion currently suITounding interpretation of the reasonable period to file a successive 
petition. 
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Contrary to the district court's conclusion Mr. Johnson should have known the time limit 
for initiating a successive post-conviction relief action, Mr. Johnson could not have known he was 
required to do so within 42 days. Instead, in providing for a year to file an initial post-conviction 
relief, during which time the petitioner is presumed to know the basis for ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the legislature acknowledged that a pro se prisoner is unlikely to be able to immediately 
prepare and file a cause of action. Had Mr. Johnson known how to research the issue, it is far 
more likely he would have sought guidance from I.C. § 19-4902 and thought that a year was a 
reasonable time to initiate the successive action. By holding Mr. Johnson to a standard he could 
not have anticipated, the district court deprived him of any meaningful opportunity to present his 
claims in deprivation of the procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Nor does Reyes v. State, 128 Idaho 413,913 P.2d 1183 (Ct. App. 1996), cited by the 
district court, signify that Mr. Johnson's ignorance of a successive post-conviction petition as the 
correct procedural mechanism is irrelevant to the determination of the "reasonable" time frame. 
CR 293. In Reyes, the defendant did not file within the statutory statute oflimitations and her 
ignorance as to that statutory period did not provide the basis for a discovery exception to the 
statute of limitations. Reyes, 128 Idaho at 415,913 P.2d at 1185. Thus, Reyes simply stands for 
the well established proposition that ignorance of the law is no excuse. Here, there is no statutory 
time frame or other legal guidance illustrating the period to initiate a successive post-conviction 
proceeding and Mr. Johnson could not have foreseen application of the death penalty standard. 
In response, the state claims that the additional facts Mr. Johnson presented explaining his 
efforts in filing the instant petition cannot be considered because the petition's untimeliness is res 
judicata. Respondent's Brief p. 12. However, as argued in Mr. Johnson's Opening Brief, res 
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judicata and the law preclude further consideration of the same issue. See also CR 297, citing 
Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 791,797,291 P.3d 474,480 (Ct. App. 2012) and Stuart v. State, 136 
Idaho 490, 495, 36 P.3d 1278, 1283 (2001 ). A reasonable time is determined "on a case-by-case 
basis." Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). The question now 
before the Court is whether the additional information, which Mr. Johnson was prevented from 
presenting due to the district court's failure to acknowledge his prose motions to excuse his 
counsel, establishes that Mr. Johnson filed within a reasonable time. This issue was not addressed 
in the prior proceedings and its consideration is not precluded by res judicata or the law of the 
case. 
The district court erred in concluding that Mr. Johnson did not present an issue of fact as 
to whether he filed his successive petition within a reasonable time. Because counsel was 
appointed to assist Mr. Johnson solely on the issue of timeliness and that is the only issue 
addressed by the district court, this case must be remanded to allow for appointment of counsel 
and to present further evidence in support of Mr. Johnson's substantive claims. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above and in his Opening Brief, Mr. Johnson respectfully asks 
this Court to reverse the district court's judgment dismissing his post-conviction claims and to 
remand this case for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted thisJ3 day of January, 2015. 
Robyn Fyffe 
7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thiJ _3,day of January, 2015, I caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing to be mailed to: Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, 
ID 83720-0010. 
Robyn Fyffe 
8 
